Chaos, Sunspots, and Automatic Stabilizers by Lawrence J. Christiano & Sharon G. Harrison
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









We havebenefittedfrom discussionswithFernandoAlvarez,JessBenhabib,Michele Boldrin, V.V.
Chari, Russell Cooper, MartinEichenbaum,IanDomowitz, Chris Gust, Nicola Persico, Michael
Woodford, Randall Wright, and Michelle Zaharchuk,and we are gratefulto Victor Valdivia for
researchassistance. Christian is gratefulto theNationalScienceFoundationfor financial support.
Thispaperispartof NBER’s researchprograminEconomic FluctuationsandGrowth. Any opinions
expressed arethose of the authorsandnot those of theFederalReserve Bank of Minneapolis, the
FederalReserve System, or theNationalBureauof Economic Research.
@ 1996 by Lawrence J. Christian andSharonG. Harrison. All rightsreserved. Shortsections of
text, not to exceed two paragraphs,maybe quoted withoutexplicit permission provided thatfull
credit, including @ notice, is given to thesource.NBER Working Paper5703
August 1996
CHAOS, SUNSPOTS, AND AUTOMATIC
STABILIZERS
ABSTRACT
We study a one-sector growth model which is standardexcept for the presence of an
externalityintheproductionfunction. The setof competitiveequilibriaislarge. Itincludesconstant
equilibria, sunspot equilibria, cyclical and chaotic equilibria, and equilibria with deterministicor
stochasticregimeswitching. The efficient allocation is characterizedby constantemployment and
a constant growth rate. We identify an income tax-subsidy schedule thatsupports the efficient
allocationastheuniqueequilibriumoutcome. Thatschedule hastwo properties:(i) it specifies the
taxrateto be anincreasingfunctionof aggregateemployment,and(ii) earningsaresubsidizedwhen
aggregateemployment is atits efficient level. The firstfeatureeliminatesinefficient, fluctuating













Interest is growing in business cycle models with multiple, self-fulfilling rational expectations
equilibria. 1 These models offer a new source of impulses to business cycles+isturbances to
expect ations-and they offer new mechanisms for propagating and magni~ing the effects of
existing shocks, such as shocks to monetary policy, to government spending, and to tech-
nology.2 Although initial versions of these models appear to rely on empirically implausible
parameter values, recent vintages me based on increasingly plausible empirical foundations.~
The policy implications of the new models differ sharply horn those of current main-
strem equilibrium models, which emphasize shifts to preferences and technology as the
basic impulses to the business cycle. These models have been used to articulate the notion
1Ifiuential early papers include Azariadis (1981), Bryant (1983), Cass and Shell (1983), Cooper and John
(1988), Diamond (1982), Farmer and Woodford (1984), Shleifer (1986), and Woodford (1986b). The first
paper to take seriously the quantitative predictions of a business cycle model with self-fulfilling expectations
is Woodford (1988). Rational expectations models with multiple equilibria have attracted attention in other
areas too. See Benhabib and Perli (1994), Krugman (1991), and Matsuyama (1991a) for a discussion in
the context of international trade and growth. See Cole and Kehoe (1996) for an analysis of the Mexican
debt crisis. See Bryant (1981) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) for discussions in the context of models of
bardcing. See Boldrin, Kiyotaki, and Wright (1993) and Mortensen (1989,1991) for discussions on dynamic
models of search and matching.
2An extensive literature documents the inadequacy of propagation in standard business cycle models.
See, for example, Burnside and Eichenbaum (1995), Christian (1988, p. 269), Cogley and N=on (1995),
Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), and Watson (1993). An emly study showing how models with indetermi-
nate equilibria provide increased mastication and propagation of monetary shocks is Farmer and Woodford
(1984). More recent studies include Beaudry and Devereux (1994), Benhabib and Farmer (1996), Guesnerie
and Woodford (1992), and Matheny (1994). For a recent mgurnent that macroeconomists are short on shocks
for accounting for the business cycle, see Cochrane (1995).
aFor exmple, the models of Benhabib and Farmer (1994), Farmer and GUO (1994) and Gali (1994a~b)
rely on increasing returns in production. (See Schmitt-Grohe 1995.) The results of subsequent empirical
research suggested that the degree of increasing returns required for the Benhabib and Farmer and Farmer
and Guo models to display sunspot equilibria is too high. (See Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 1995 for
one such effort, and see also Benhabib and Farmer 1995 for a review of several others. ) These empirical
results in turn stimulated further theoretical work: recently, Benhabib and Fwmer (1995) showed that a tw~
sector version of theti model requires a much lower degree of increasing returns to guarantee the existence
of sunspot equilibria.that economic fluctuations represent the economy’s efficient responses to shoti and to cast
doubt on the desirability of macroeconomic stabilization policy.4 In contrast, the new mod-
els suggest that institutional arrangements and policy rules designed to reduce fluctuations
in output may be desirable. (See Grandmont 1986, Guesnerie and Woodford 1992, Shleifer
1986, Woodford 1986b,1991, and the articles in the symposium summarized in Woodford
1994.)5
This paper pursues these ideas in a pmticdar business cycle model. The model studied
is a version of the one-sector, external increasing returns model recently studied by Bater
and King (1991), Benhabib and Farmer (1994,1995), and Farmer and Guo (1994,1995 ).6
Our version of this model has a significant advantage relative to the versions analyzed in the
literature. In those, analysis of the global set of equilibria is typically quite difficult, and
so resemchers confine themselves to studying the set of equilibria that is local to the steady
state. By contrast, the structure of our model is such that the global set of equilibria is
transparent and can therefore easily be analyzed. It turns out that this set of equilibria is
remmkably rich, and it includes sunspot equilibria, regime switthing equilibria, and equilibria
4See Kydland and Prescott (1980) and Sargent (1979, p. 393) for a statement of the case that output sta-
bilization is undesirable. The “preference and technology” literature on macroeconomics did not completely
rule out the possibility that some forms of stabilization might be desirable. Researchers who incorporated
frictions like price rigidities did see some role for activist policy. (See Fischer 1980.)
5An import ant early example of the potential stabilizing role of institutional arrangements occurs outside
the area of business cycle analysis and is provided by the work of Bryant (1981) and Diamond and Dybvig
(1983). They showed that a spontaneous burst of pessimism on the part of depositors could trigger s~
cially inefficient bank runs and that a government policy-deposit insurance-could be designed that would
eliminate this source of instability.
6As in these papers, we do not formally articulate what the source of external increasing returns is.
Examples of analyses that are explicit about the nature of external effects include Diamond (1982), Hewitt
and McAfee (1988), and Romer (1986). Benhabib and Farmer (1994) suggest the possibility that there
is a way of reformdating our model so that the source of incre=ing retmns is internal to the fire, while
leaving our basic analysis unaffected. The analysis in Romer (1987) suggests yet another possibility: that the
increasing returns may actually reflect gains from specialization. We have not yet explored these possibilities.
2which appear chaotic. Our analysis illustrates the potential pitfalls of focusing only on the
equilibria that are local to some steady state.
We establish that the set of bounded solutions to a particular expectational difference
equation corresponds to equilibria for our model. This set is simple to characterize because
the difference equation is only first order and has a simple analfiic representation. This
is true,
model.
despite the fact that capital accumulation and employment are endogenous in the
An important feature of the difference equation is that for every initial condition,
it has two solutions. This tw~branch feature of the Euler equation is an important reason
the set of equilibria for the model includes regime switching equilibria of the type studied
by Hmilton (1989) and equilibria that appear chaotic.7
Even the efficient allocations in our model are straightforward to determine, despite the
lack of convexity in the aggregate resource constraint set due to the externality. The efficient
allocations are unique and involve no fluctuations.
We examine the operating characteristics of two automatic stabilizer tax regimes. Each
has the property that the income t= rate rises if the
falls if it goes into a recession. Under each tax regime,
equilibrium, in which output is comt ant. However, one
economy moves into a boom and
the economy has a unique interior
tm regime stabilizes output on an
inefficient level of output, and the other stabilizes output on the efficient allocations. We
show that implementing the fist tax regime may increase, or even decrease, welfare.a We
7For other exmples of a “branching” Euler equation in infinite horizon growth models, see Benhabib and
Perli (1994) and Benhabib and Rustichini (1994).
8This possibility has been discussed by Guesnerie and Woodford (1992, pp. 383–388), Shleifer (1986),
and Woodford (1991, p. 103) in other contexts.establish two things about designing a tax system that supports the efficient allocations as
the unique interior equilibrium. First, such a system must specify that the t= rate vary
with the level of aggregate economic activity. When the tax rate is specified to be a &ed
constant, then there is more than one equilibrium, with the efficient one being only one
of them. Second, the efficient equilibrium in this case is determinate, so that a standard
local analysis of the set of equilibria would falsely conclude that only one equilibrium is
possible. These restits draw attention to the importance of the proper design of automatic
stabilizer t= systems and point to a potential pitfall in the traditional approach to policy
design, which tends to focus on minimizing output variance.o These results also illustrate
the potential dangers of the standard practice of focusing exclusively on local equilibria.
Finally, our model provides a convenient vehicle for articulating some econometric issues
that arise in the analysis of models with multiple equilibria. As emphasized by Woodford
(1991, p. 77), there is a widespread perception that “anything goes” with sunspot models—
any set of facts can be explained. The model in this paper can be used to illustrate that
sunspot
ception,
models in principle do impose discipline on an empirical analysis.10 With one ex-
the econometric procedures used to analyze standard models with unique equilibria
and driven by exogenous shocks can be used to analyze and test sunspot models too. The
exception is that procedures which select parameter values by equating model first moments
and corresponding sample first moments may no longer be well-defined. This is because
gAn itiuential example is the analysis of Poole (1970), who argues that the appropriate choice of monet ary
policy regime depends on whether sho~ emanate from financial markets or investment decisions. The
criterion driving the policy design in Poole’s analysis is minimization of output variance.
10See Dagsvfi and Jovanovic (1994), Farmer and Guo (1995), Imrohoroglu (1993), Jovanovic (1989),
Sargent and Wall=e (1987), and Woodford (1987,1988,1991) for further development of this point.
4there may be a set of possible first moments associated with any parameter configuration,
depending on which equilibrium the economy is in.
The intuition underlying the dyntics in our model is essentially the same as that de-
scribed by Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Farmer and Guo (1994). The economy is
perfectly competitive, and individual producers have linearly homogeneous product ion func-
tions in capital and labor, which are strictly concave in each. However, economywide average
output operates as an externality in front of each firm’s production function, shifting it up
when average output is high. The latter is the key to why there are multiple equilibria in
our model and to why expectations can act as an independent source of fluctuations. If all
households act on the conjecture that the current period’s wage rate is high by supplying
more labor services to the market, then the market-clearing wage is high because of the
externality on labor. Similarly, if households act on the conjecture that next period’s rental
rate on capital is high by buying more investment goods today, then their conjecture will be
validated. 11
A regime which specifies that the tax rate rises with aggregate employment has the
potential to stabilize output by defeating the mechanism that gives rise to multiple equilibria.
Conjectures that the rate of return on market activity is high cannot be self-fulfilling if the
11This is the case for two reasons. First, the externality on capital prevents next period’s incresse in
capital from directly reducing the marginal product of capital. (That the externality is strong enough for
the aggregate capital stock not to enter the marginal product of capital is the reason the difference equation
mentioned above is fist order, which in turn is the reason the global set of equilibria is transparent in our
model. ) Second, the externality on labor helps ensure that the increase in next period’s wage rate, occasioned
by the rise in capital next period, stimdates a large increase in employment. This indirectly helps drive up
next period’s rental rate on capital.
5proceeds are t=ed away.12
The outline of the paper is as follows. Our model and equilibrium concept are presented
in Section 2, Section 3 establishes our characterization resdt for the set of competitive
equilibria. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the deterministic and stochastic equilibria of the model,
respectively. Econometric issues are addressed in the context of the analysis of stochastic
equilibria. Section 6 considers the impact of an automatic stabilizing tax policy and reports
the socially optimal allocations. Section 7 concludes.
2. The Model
Let St denote the realization of the exogenous shocks at date t. In models with shocks
to fundamentals, St would include shifts to preferences or technology, or to government
spending. In this paper, we do not consider such shocks. In the stochastic versions of
our model, St represents disturbances which influence equilibrium outcomes, but which do
not tiect fundamentals. We let St = (s., S1,....St) denote a history of realizations up to
and including date t. For simplicity, we only consider environments in which the number
of possible values of St is finite for each t. The probability of history St is denoted p~(St).
To conserve on notation, from here on we delete the subscript -t on p. This should not
cause confusion: that the functions Pt(St) and p, (s”), r # t are different is evident horn
the fact that the quantity of elements in St and s“ is dfierent. We adopt this notational
120ur argument is related to the one in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1996). They show that a procyclical
tax policy (designed to support a balanced budget) can destabilize the economy by making possible sunspot
equilibria.
6convention for all functions of histories. The probability y of s~+l conditional on St is denoted
p(st+l ISt) - p,+l(s’+l)/p,(s’). We now discuss the agents in our model and our concept of
equilibrium.
2.1. Households
We assume a large number of identical households. At each St and t, the representative
household values consumption and leisure henceforth according to the following utility func-
tion:
where DC (O,1) is the discount rate, s~ IStdenotes histories, s~, that are continuations of the
given history, St, and c(s~), n(s~) denote consumption and labor, respectively, conditional
history s~. The household must respect the following sequence of budget constraints:
on
C(sj) + k(sj) – (1 – a)k(s~-l) =
[1 – T(sj)][T(sj)k(sj-’) + w(s~)n(s~)] + T(sj), all Sjls’, j 2 t
(2.2)
where r(s~) and w(s~) denote the mmket rental rate on capital and the wage rate, respec-
tively. Also, ~(s~) is the tax rate on income, T(s~) denotes lump-sum transfers from the
government, and k(s~) denotes the stock of capital at the end of period j, given history
sj. The household also takes k(st–l ) as given at St. Finally, the household must satisfy the
7following inequality constraints:
k(sj)~ o,c(s~) >0,0< n(s~) <1 (2.3)
for all s~ IStand j ~ t and takes as given and known the actual future date-state contingent
prices and taes:
{r(.sj), w(#),7(#), T(sj); j ~ t, all # Is’}. (2.4)
We assume that
U(c,n) = loge+ alog(l – n,) (2.5)
where a > 0.
Formally, at each St and t, the household problem is to choose {c(s~), n(s~), k(s~); j z t,
all s~ I St} to maximize (2.1) subject to (2.2), (2.3), (2.4), and the initial stock of capital,
k(st-l ). The intertemporal Eder equations corresponding to this problem are
UC(N”) = p ~ p(~”+l Isj)uc(s~+l){[l – r(s~+l)]r(s~+l) + 1 – 6} (2.6)
~j+lIst
all s~ ISt, j z t, and the intratemporal Euler equations are
-Un(s’) =[1 - Tow, all Sj ISt, j > t.
UC(SJ)
— (2.7)
Here, ud(s~) and u.(s~ ) denote the partial derivatives of u with respect to its first and second
8arguments, evaluated at c(s~), n(s~). Finally, the household’s transversality condition is
(2.8)
The sufficiency of the Euler equations, (2.6) and (2.7), and transversality condition, (2.8),
for an interior solution to the household problem may be established by applying the proof
strategy for Theorem 4.15 in Stokey and Lucas with Prwcott (1989).
2.2. Firms
We assume a large number of identical fires, each of which solves a static problem at every
St. As a result, we can, without risking confusion, simplify the notation by deleting the St
notation. The representative firm faces the following technology relating its output, Y, to
its capital, K, and labor, N, inputs and to the economywide average level of output, y:
Y = f(y, K,N) = y7~aN(1-”)) O< ~,a <1. (2.9)
We assume that
a=l–~. (2.10)
The relation between the econom~ide average level of output and the econom~ide average
stock of capital, k, and labor, n, is obtained by solving g = ~(y, k, n) for y:
(2.11)
9given (2.10). The line~ity of this function in terms of k is essential for simplifying the
analysis to come. In addition, as discussed by Rebelo (1991), linearity allows for growth to
occur endogenously.
The lirm takes y, r, and w as given and chooses K, N to m~irnize profits:
subject to (2.9). The firms’
Y–TK–wN
fist-order conditions for labor and capital are
(2.12)
f~=w, f~=r (2.13)
where f~ and j~ are the derivatives of ~ with respect to its second and tbird arguments,
respectively. We assume firms behave symmetrically, so that consistency requires y = Y, k =
K, n = N. Imposing these, we get
fN= (1 – a)nk, fK = an2 (2.14)
with ~ = 2/3. With this value of ~, the model impliw that labor’s share is 2/3, which is close
to the value estimated using the national income and product accounts (Christian 1988).
102.3. Government
The income t= rate policy, r (St), is specified exogenously, and we require that the following
budget constraint be satisfied for each St:
T(SL)[T(St)k(St-l) + Wan] = ~(St).
2.4. Equilibrium
The resource constraint for this economy is




Definition 2.1. A sequence-of-markets equilibriumis a set of prices {r(st), W(st); afl St, a]]
t > O}, quantities {y(st), C(st), k(s’), n(st); d] st, d] t 2 O}, and a tax policy {7(s’), T(st);
d] st, t > O} W“th the follom”ng four propetiies for each t, st:
. Given the prica, the quarttities solve the household’s problem.
. Given the pricw and q“ven {y(st) = k(sL–1)n(st)2}J the quantities solve the firm’s
problem.
l The government’s budget constraint is satisfied.
l The resource constrm”ntis satisfied.
We find it useful to define an intetior equilibrium. This is a sequence-of-markets equilibrium
in which a ~ n(st) ~ b for all St for some a and b satisfying O< a ~ b < 1.
131t is easily verfied that the analysis would have been unaltered had we instead adopted the date O,
krow-Debreu equilibrium concept. In this case, households would have had access to complete contingent
claims markets.
113. Characterizing Equilibrium
In the next section of the paper, we study deterministic equilibria in which prices and quan-
tities do not vary with St and stochastic (sunspot) equilibria in which prices and quantities
do vmy with St.The analysis of these equilibria is made possible by a characterization result,
which is presented next.
Substituting (2.13) and (2.14) into the household’s intertemporal Euler equation, (2.6),
we get
1
~;t) ,;,t P(S’+l Ist)z(~:+l) {[1 - T(s’+’)]an(s’+’)’ + 1- ~} —=D— (3.1)
E(st) s
where
Substituting (2.14) into the
C(st) k(s’)
z(st) = k(s~_~)I ‘(st) = ~(st-1)“
household intratemporal Euler equation, (2.7), we get
E(st) = [1– T(st)]:n(s~)[l – n(st)].
(3.2)
(3.3)
The resource constraint implies that
E(st) = n(st)2 + 1 – 6 – A(st). (3.4)
Combining the two Euler equations, (3.1) and (3.3), and the raource constraint, (3.4), our
12system collapses into a single equation in current and next period’s employment:




V(n,nf; T’) = _ P[(l - ~’)a(n’)’ + 1- 6]




A=n’+l– 6–(1– T):nj(l–n). (3.7)
Here, a ‘ denotes next period’s value of the variable. The transversality condition, (2.8), is
equivalent to
[n(s~)’ + 1 – 6 – [1 – T(sT)]:n(s’-)[l – ~(sT)l] = o
#+ma~ ~~p(s~) ‘
ST [1 - T(s~)];n(sT)[l - n(s~)]
The basic equilibrium characterization rault for this economy is
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that T(st) -0. If ford] s’ and t >0,
{n(s’)} satisfim (3.5)
and
asn(st) sbforsome O<a< b<l
then {n(st )} corresponds to an equilibrium.
(3.8)
Proof. To establish the result, we need to compute the remaining objects—prices and
quantities-in an equilibrium md verify that they satisfy (2.6), (2.7), (2.8), (2.13), and
(2.16). A candidate set of objects is found in the obvious way. The sufficiency of the first-
order and transversality conditiom for household optimization and the sficiency of the
first-order conditions for firm optimization guarantee that these me an equilibrium.
13The characterization result indicates that understanding the equilibria of the model r~
quires understanding the v function. It is easily cofimed that v = w defines a quadratic
function in n’ for each fixed n, U. (Later, we refer to w as the Euler emor.) Hence, for each
n, w there are two possible n’ : n’ = j.(n, U) and n’ = jl (n,,u), where
Here,
p(n)q(n, w) 1–6
b(n, 0) = ,c(n, w) =









The function v has the shape of a saddle, as can be seen in Figure la. The intersection of w
and the zero plane (w = O) is depicted in Figure la as the boundary between the light and
dark region of v. This intersection defines the curves ju(., O) and ~1 (-, O), which are shown
in Figure lb. We refer to these as the upper and lower branches of the function w. The
lower brmch intersects the 45-degree line at two points, which are denoted fil and fi2. These
intersection points cannot be seen in Figure lb, but can be seen in Figure lc, which displays
n’ —n for n near the origin. It is easy to see from Figure la that with higher values of
u, ji increases and iu decreases. The figure also indicates that for these functions to be
14real-valued, w must not be too big.
The branches in the figure are
@ = 1.03-*, 6 = 0,02. Here, E1 =
computed using our baseline parametetization, o = 2,
0.02 and fiz = 0.31. The gross growth rates of capital
(that is, A) at these two points aze 0.973 and 1.004, respectively. Our assigned value of
~ is often used in the real business cycle literature. The value of a causes the model’s
implication for the share of income going to capital and labor to coincide with
of this quantity based on the national income and product accounts. (See,
one estimate
for example,
Christian 1988.) In addition, this pararneterization of a facilitates some
results described above. However, we have verified that the shape of the v
of the analytic
function is not
very sensitive to the perturbations in a. The assigned value of 6 can be justified based on
our model’s capital accumulation equation and on U.S. capital stock and investment data.
(See, for example, Christian
data may be brought to bear
1988 and Christian and Eichenbaum 1992.) The issue of how
to determine a value of u is addressed below.
4. Deterministic Equilibria
We begin by considering deterministic equilibria, in which prices and quantities depend on
t, but not on st. To simplify the presentation, we drop the history notation, and we use
the conventional time subscript notation instead. As we shall see, the set of deterministic
equilibria is qtite rich. For example, any constant sequence {nt }, with nt = fil or nt = fi2,
satisfies the conditions of the characterization result and so is an equilibrium. Similarly, any
sequence with no E (fil, fi) and n~+l = fl (n~,O), t z Ois also an equilibrium, with nt ~ fi2.
15Here, fi satisfies fi > fi2 and RI = fl(fi,O). Figure 2 exhibits two equilibrium paths, one
sttiing with no = 0.4 and the other with no = 0.2. Each path convergw monotonically to
fi2.
Other deterministic equilibria are more exotic and
switching. For example, the equilibrium employment
display a variety of types of regime
policy function could be time non-
stationary, with employment determined by the lower branch for, say, six periods, followed
by a singleperiod jump to the upper branch, followed by another six-period sojourn on the
lower branch, and so on. The model has another type of regime switching equilibrium too,
in which the employment policy function is discontinuous.
As an example of the latter, consider equilibria in which employment, n’, is determined
by the upper branch for n over one set of intervals in (O,1) and by the lower branch over the
complement of these intervals. One example of this is given by
I
f~(n, 0) for fil < n ~ 7721
n’ = f(n), where j(n) a
fU(n, O) for ml < n < m2
(4.1)
[ fl(n)o) for m’ <n
where ml < fi2 and m’ are a chosen set of numbers. By considering dfierent values of a,
(4.1) defines a family of maps. A we sh~ see, there are elements in this family of maps
which exhibit characteristics that resemble chaos.14 There are several concepts of chaos in
14For other discussions of chins, with economic examples, see Boldrin and Woodford (1990) and Mat-
suyama (1991b).
16the literature. We consider two.
4.1. Topological Chaos
We consider the topological concept of chaos as discussed in Devaney (1989). We require
two definitions first:
Definition 4.1. The map j : J 4 J is said to be topo~ogicdly transitive if for any pair of
open sets, U,V c J, there ew”sts k >0 such that fk (U) fl V # 0.
Here, ~1(n)
that for almost
= ~(n), ~2(n) = ~[~(n)], and so on. Loosely, the above definition says
all initial conditions, iterations on the map, j, produce an orbit (that is,
n, j(n), f 2(n), ...) that visits every region, no matter how small, of J. An example of a map
that violates this condition is the policy function of the standard one-sector growth model.
For any initial capital stock, iterations on the policy function generate a sequence that
converges monotonically to the steady state. -If the initial capital stock is below the steady
state, then capital stocks smaller than the initial condition and above steady state are not
visited. A second definition that is important is
Definition 4.2. The map j : J A J has sensitive dependence on im”tid conditions if there
w“sts 6>0 such that, for any n c J and any neighborhood N of n, there exists y l N and
m ~ Osuch that lf~(n) – jm(g)l >6,
This says that for any initial condition, n, and any neighborhood, no matter how small,
around n, there is at least one other initial condition whose orbit eventually dtiers by at
least 6 from the orbit of n. Note that the parameter 6 is chosen as a function of the map,
but it is not a function of n,or the size of the neighborhood around n. A sequence generated
by a map that etibits sensitivity to initial conditions is dficult to forecast for two reasons.
17First, the slightest measurement error in the initial conditions may result in a substantial
error of forecast. Second, even if the initial conditions are measured accurately, then any
slight rounding error in computing an orbit is likely to be magnified.
Then, we have
Definition 4.3. Let J be a set. The map j : J - J is said to be Aaotic on J if
l j has sensitive dependence on im”tid conditions.
l t is topologicdy transitive.
l perio~c points off are dense in J.
By a periodic point, n, we mean one for which there is some k >0 such that n = ~k(n).
Theorems exist that establish conditions under which a given map is chaotic. Unfortu-
nately, these theorems require either that ~ be continuous (see, for example, chapter 1.1 of
Devaney, 1989) or that it be piecewise continuous and differentiable with derivative greater
than unity in absolute value. (See Lasota and Mackey, 1985, chapter 6.) We are not aware
of theorems that include maps of the kind considered here. Instead, we follow the strategy
pursued in Domowitz and E1-Gamal (1993,1994) and develop simulation-based evidence on
whether our map is chaotic.
Consider semitivity to initial conditions first. For this, we compute the Lyapunov coef-
ficient, L(n), associated with the map, ~, defined in (4.1). The function, L, maps n E (O,1)
into the real line. For any fixed fi E (O,1),
(4,2)
18where nj+l = ~(ni), i = l) ..., T – 1, nl = fi,,and d~(ni)/dn denotes the derivative of j with
respect to n, evaluated at n = ni. To see why L is of interest, note that the sum is equivalent
to log * . If h is a periodic point of any finite order k, then jk(fi) = fi. If it is a stable
periodic point, then ~ <1. If T = rnk, where m is an arbitrary positive integer, then
(4.3)
where nl = fi, and nl+l = ~k(nl), 1= 1, ....m – 1. This suggests that if E, is a stable periodic
point of any period, then L(fi) must be negative. But if ~ has a stable periodic point, or a
point whose orbit intersects with such a point, then it violates sensitivity to initial conditions.
Thus, a negative value of L(n) indicates that one of the conditions necessary for j to be
chaotic fails. A positive value of L(n) is a necessary condition for chaos.
Figure 3 shows L(h) for a in the range 1.25 to 2.20, with fi fied at 0.255.1s We truncated
the infinite sum in (4.2) at T = 2,000. We set m1 = 0.33, m2 = 0.70. Note that L(fi,) is
positive for values of u less than 1.5. Hence, for values of a in this range, there is evidence that
~ is characterized by sensitivity to initial conditions. To investigate this further, comider
IS = 1.25. Figures 4a and 4b show two sequences of 400 observations on hours worked,
simulated using f. In one cme the initial condition is 0.455, and in the other the initial
condition is 0.454. Despite the fact that the initial conditions are very close, the two orbits
are quite different. In fact, they are eventually as dissimilar as they would have been had the
lsln ~OmPUtatlon~ experiments not reported here, we found that the graph in Figure 3 is insensitive to
the value of h. This insensitivity is consistent with r=tits in Figure 5, discussed below.
19initial conditions been far apti. By the 70~~observation, the two series are completely out
of phase. Then, by around the 310t~observation, they are almost identical again. Although
the amplitude of the two series mies somewhat, most of the differences between the two
series has to do with ph~e. Note how strikingly different these equilibria are from the ones
shown in Figure 2.
Now consider topological transitivity. One way to investigate this is to compute the
histogram of orbits associated with different initial conditions. To compute this histogram,
we divide the unit interval into 3,000 equal-width intervals and approximate the histogram of
an orbit by the number of times hours worked lands in each interval in a simulation of length
50,000. Figure 5 shows histograms for orbits associated with fou initial conditiom drawn
from very different parts of the unit interval. These histograms are similar in two respects.
First, consistent with topological trmsitivity, each orbit appears to cover the same region
of the unit interval. In particular, let J denote the union of intervals with positive mass in
Figure 5. Then J appears to be independent of the initial conditions. This is consistent
with the notion that orbits associated with almost all n c J wander through every small
neighborhood of J. The second striking feature of the histograms in Figure 5 is that they
appear to have the same shape. Thus, the histograms are consistent not only with the notion
that almost all orbits in J visit each subinterval in J with positive probability (topological
transitivity), but they are also consistent with the notion that the probability of visiting each
subinterval is the same across orbits.
204.2. Statistical Chaos
A second concept of chws, closely related to the first, is statistical (Lasota and Mackey
1985). Here, we follow the treatment in Domowitz and E1-Gamal (1993,1994) and E1-Gamal
(1991).
Let g be a density function defined on J. That is, JJg(n)dn = 1 and g(n) 20 for all
n l J. If we draw from g and apply the map fi : J + J to each draw, we have a new
distribution of points on J. Denote this distribution by ~~. Then following Domowitz and
E1-Gamal (1993,1994), we say that f exhibits
property or the mixing property.
Definition 4.4. The map j : J ~ J is ergodic
statistical chaos
if
for all g c G.
if j; exhibits the ergodic
For re~arity conditions on the limiting density function, q, and the set of density func-
tions, G, see Domowitz and E1-Gamal (1993,1994). (Obviously, G cannot include density
tictions which place mass exclusively on a single periodic point.) For f to be ergodic does
not actually require that f; settle down for large i. The mixing property does require this.
Definition 4.5. The map f : J ~ J is mixing if
The properti~ of ergodicity and mixing are closely related to
transitivity and sensitive dependence. For example, consider a
21
the notions of topological
density function, g, whichassigns positive probability to an arbitrarily selected ad extremely small interval of initial
conditions. Mixing requires that the orbits of these points eventually cover the same range
in J as if the initial conditions were instead drawn from a
probability to every subinterval of J.
We adopted the simulation-based approach of Domowitz
density that assigns positive
and E1-Gamal to investigate
whether our j map exhibits statistical chaos. Thus, we considered two g functions. One
places a uniform distribution on the interval [0.16, 0.32] and the other places a uniform
distribution on the interval [0.58,0.71], In
function and computed ~31000 for each draw.
each case, we drew 1,000 times from the g
The resulting histograms are shown in Figure
6. There are two interesting features of these histograms. First, to the unaided eye they
appear very similar to each other, consistent with the notion that f satisfies the mixing
condition. Still, the differences can be re~onably substantial, as the bottom graph in Figure
6 shows. Second, the histograms in Figure 6 closely resemble the orbit histograms shown
in Figure 5. This suggests that our f map approximately satisfies concepts of ergodicity
in standard econometrics textbooks (for example, Hamilton 1994, pp. 46-47), in which
statistical properties of individual sample realizations (that is, histograms of orbits) coincide
with q = limi~a ~~.
5. Sunspot Equilibria
In this section, we study equilibria of our model in which prices and quantities respond
to St. We construct two equilibria to illustrate the possibilities. The fist, which we call
22a conventional sunspot equilibrium, uses jl only. This equilibrium is constructed near the
deterministic steady state, fi,2, which, as noted above, has a continuum of deterministic
equilibria which converge to it. Our choice of name reflects that this type of equilibrium is
standard in the quantitative sunspot literature.16 The second equilibrium considered, which
we call a regime switching sunspot equilibrium, involves stochastically switching between fl
and ju. Our analysis of these equilibria focuses on their welfare and business cycle properties.
For this analysis, we find it useful to use the business cycle properties of U.S. data and of a
standard real business cycle model w benchmarks. We conclude this subsection by making
some observations about the econometrics of sunspot models in general and by discussing
the empirical plausibility of our model.
5.1. Conventional Sunspot Equilibrium
In this equilibrium, s c R is independently distributed over time, with s = –0.06 and
s = 0.06 with probability 1/2 each. These values for s were chosen so that the equilibrium’s
implication for the standard deviation of Hodrick-Prescott detrended, logged equilibrium
output coincides with the corresponding figure in the data. Given any n, next period’s hours
worked, n’, is computed by first drawing s and then solving
n’ = jl(n, s) (5.1)
16Because a continuum of other nonstochastic equilibria etists near the steady state equilibrium, fiz, this
equilibrium is said to be indeterminate (Boldrin and Rustichini 1994, p. 327). For a general discussion of
the link between indeterminate equilibria and sunspots, see Woodford (1986a). Examples of quantitative
analyses that construct sunspot equilibria in the neighborhood of indeterminate equilibria include Benhabib
and Farmer (1994,1995), Farmer and Guo (1994,1995), and Gali (1994a,b).
23where ~1is defined in (3.9). We set the initial level of hours worked, no, to fi2. Recall that
fi2 is the higher of the two deterministic steady states associated with the lower branch, ~1.
That is, of the two solutions to x = ~1 (z, O), fi2 is the larger of the two.
To establish that this stochastic process for employment corresponds to an equilibrium,
it is sticient to verify that the conditions of the characterization result are satisfied. The
first condition is satisfied by construction, and the second is satisfied because n(s~) remains
within a compact interval that is a strict subset of the unit interval. That is, let a be the
smaller of the two values of n that solve a = jl (a, –0.06), and let b > a be the unique value
of n with the property a = ~1 (b, –0.06). Here, a and b are 0.0249 and 0.9509 after rounding.
We verified that if a < n < b, then a ~ n’ ~ b for n’ = jl(n, –0.06) and n’ = jl(n, 0.06).
Thus, prob[ a < n’ s b I a s n S b] = 1. It follows that a < n(st) S b for all histories,
St, with p(st) > 0. The conditions of the characterization restit are satisfied, and so we
conclude that n(st) corresponds to an equilibrium.
The first-moment properties of this equilibrium are reported in Table 1. They are similar
to the corresponding properties of the U.S. data and of the real business cycle model. The
second-moment properties of this equilibrium (see Table 3) also compare favorably with
the corresponding sample analogs, at least relative to the performance of the real business
cycle model (see Table 2). In this context, three observations are worth stressing. First,
note the equilibrium’s prediction that consumption is smooth relative to output and that
productivity is roughly as volatile as hours worked. In the latter respect, the conventional
sunspot equilibrium actually conforms more closely to the data than does the real business
24cycle model. The real business cycle model implies that productivity is about 65 percent
more volatile than hours worked, whereas the conventional sunspot equilibrium implies that
productivity is about as volatile as hours worked. In the data, productivity is about 30
percent less volatile than hours worked. Second, hews and productivity are both procyclical
in the equilibrium, as they are in the data. The equilibrium’s implication that productivity
is procylical reflects the increasing returns in the model. Procyclical
account for the fact that equilibrium hours worked and consumption are
productivity helps
both procyclical in
the model. Finally, the model inherits a shortcoming of standard real business cycle models
in overpredicting the correlation between productivity and hours worked. In the data, this
quantity is essentially zero.
Some of these properties can also be seen by examining the plots in Figure 7. They
are graphs of the logged and Hodrick-Prescott filtered data from the equilibrium described
above. Consumption is smooth and investment is volatile in these graphs. In addition,
hours worked and productivity are seen to be procyclical. Overall, this sunspot equilibrium
compmes quite well to the real business cycle model in its ability to mimic key features of
postwar U.S. business cycles.
5.2. Regime Switching Sunspot Equilibrium
For this equilibrium, s = [s(1), s(2)] c R2, with s(1) G {u, 1} and s(2) = w c {–0.06, 0.06}.
We set the date O value of hours worked to n(so) = fi2. We use the following recursive
procedure to assign a level of employment to each history, s~,that is logically possible, given
the specified so. For any history, St,and associated level of employment, n(s~), let n(s~+l) be
25as follows:
n(s’+’) = f.,+, (,)(n(s’), St+,(z)) (5.2)
for t = 1)2, .... We construct an equilibrium by devising a sequence of probabilities, p(s’),
that assigns positive probability only to histories, St, for which a < n.(st) < b, for some a, b
such that O < a < b < 1. When the value of s(1) changes along a history, we say there has
been a regime switch.
Consider the following probabilities for S,+l(1):
{
0.9, fil < n(sc) < fi2, fil = 0.0370, fi2 = 0.9279
prob[s,+l(l) = /] =
1, otherwise.
(5.3)
Let s(2) have the same distribution as s in the previous equilibrium. We assume that
the two elements of s are independently distributed. Let a and b be defined as in the
conventional sunspot equilibrium. We verified numerical y that, under these circurnstantes,
if a s n(s~) s b, then prob[a s n(s~+l) s b] = 1, It follows that, for all Stsuch that p(st) >0,
a ~ n(st) < b.17This establishes the second of the two conditions of the characterization
restit. To establish the first condition, note that by (5.2),
v (n(st), n(st+l)) = st+1(2), for all st (5.4)
170u.r specification of fil and fi2 is crucial for guaranteeing the second condition of the characterization
resdt. For example, with fil = a and fi2 = b, histories, St, in which hours worked fluctuate betieen values
that approach O and 1 occur with high probability. With p(st ) specified in this way, the second condition of
the char=tertiation resdt fails.
26and by construction of the Etier error, s~+l(2),
~ p(s’+’ Ist)s,+,(2) = O, for all s’.
St+llst
This establishes that the conditions of the characterization result are satisfied,
elude that n.(s~ ) corresponds to an equilibrium.




First-moment properties are reported in Panel C of Table 1, while second-moment properties
are reported in Panel B of Table 3. Regime switching is the key to understanding the
dynamics of this equilibrium. Periodically, the economy switches to the upper branch, fu,
where employment is very high. The economy typically stays on the upper branch only
briefly, and when it switches down again, employment drops to a very low level: near a.
Employment then rises slowly until another switch occurs, when the economy jumps to the
upper branch, and the process continues. The fact that the economy spends much time in
the left region of the lower branch explains why average employment in this equilibrium is
so low. This also explains why investment is, on average, negative. Regarding the second-
moment properties, output is substantially more volatile than it is in the data. Also, output
displays very little serial correlation. The positive serial correlation produced by sojourns on
the lower branch is offset by the negative serial correlation associated with transient jumps
to the upper brmch. These observations are supported by the time series plots of the logged,
Hodrick-Prescott filtered data born this equilibrium, presented in Figure 8.
The regime switching equilibrium nicely illustrates a type of sunspot equilibrium that
27is possible. However, in contrast with the conventional sunspot equilibrium, the second-
moment properties of this equilibrium do not match the corresponding quantities in the
data.
5.3. Empirical Evaluation of the Model
A variety of other econometric methods can be used to assess the empirical plausibility of
this model.lg One test of the model analyzes the fitted values of the sunspot shocks, s. Given
values for the model parameters, these shocks can be recovered using employment data. 19
For this test, we used the data on per capita, qumterly hours worked covering the period
1955Q3-1984Q1 studied in Christian (1988) and Christian and Eichenbaurn (1992). The
data, shown in Figure 9a, were converted into fractions of available time worked under the
assumption that households’ available time is 15 hours per day (1,369 hours per quarter).
The fitted values ofs imply that all quarterly U.S. observation on hours worked lie on jl, that
is, ~(1) = 1 throughout the sample. This complements the findings of the second-moment
analysis reported above, which indicates that—wit h.in the confines of this model—regime
switching does not improve our understanding of the aggregate data.
The time series on the fitted Euler equation error, 3(2), are shown in Figure 9c. The model
requires that this shock satisfy (5.5). All dynamic models have at least one orthogonalit y
18For a formal statistical appro~h to the moment comparison strategy for testing undertaken in the Previ-
ous subsection, see the method based on the work of Hansen (1982) developed in Christian and Eichenbaum
(1992). This analysis integrates parameter uncertainty into evaluations of the “distance” between model and
data second moments.
19For any two consecutive observations on employment, n and n’, s(2) = v(n, n’). Then, given s(2), one
finds the two values of z, zl < ZUsuch that s(2) = v(n, z). If n’ = xl, then s(1) = 1, and s(1) = u otherwise.condition like this. Generalized method of moments (GMM) procedures for testing it have
been developed ad applied extensively, beginning with the work of Hansen (1982) and
Hansen and Singleton (1982). These tests focus on a model’s implication that date t + 1
Euler errors be orthogonal to all information available at date t, including a constant. The
evidence in Figure 9Cindicates that this test fails: the sample mean of the fitted Euler error
is significwtly negative (—O .27), indicating that a nonzero constant is
this variable. The second-moment properties of the fitted values of ~(2
useful for predicting
are more consistent
with the theory. Figure 9b shows the scatter plot of consecutive values of fitted Euler errors,
and it suggests that the fist-order autocorrelation of ~(2) is not significantly different from
zero. (The point estimate is –O.18, with standard error O.0920. ) Figure 9Cshows the scatter
plot of the empirical measure of hours worked at date t, nt, against the date t + 1 fitted
Euler error, ~t+l(2). Here too, the evidence does not imply a strong relationship between
these variables. The point estimate of the correlation between these two variables is –0.20,
slightly more than twice the standard error of 0.09. These results are subject to two caveats.
First, they do not take into account sampling uncertainty in the estimated values of a and
6. However, the results in Ch.ristiano md Eichenbaum (1992) suggest that this is very small
and unlikely to chmge the results. Second, they me based on arbitrmily setting a = 2. A
conventional GMM approach to this would select a value for a to ensure that sample analogs
of the population orthogonality properties of the Euler errors are satisfied. For example, the
value of a that sets the sample average of the fitted Euler errors to zero is 6 = 2.72. Apart
‘“The standard error is l/fi, where 115 is the number of observations in the sample.
29from changing the sample mem, this change in the value of u does not alter the properties
of the Euler errors reported above.
We conclude that there is little evidence in the Etier errors against the model and that
the upper branch appears not to be operative in the data.
Interestingly, conditional on ruling out the upper branch, ~., the model implies a re-
duced form relation very much like the one found in standard models driven by fundamental
shocks. For example, equation (5.1) closely resembles the equilibrium relation for employ-
ment implied by the general equilibrium model analyzed in Sargent (1979, p. 377). The only
qualitative difference is that in the latter, the shock variable, s, is a combination of distur-
bances to preferences and technology, while here it is a sunspot shock, s(2). An implication
is that the model can be estimated and tested using the same maximum likelihood strategies
pursued in Altug (1989), Christian (1988), Hall (1996), and McGrattan, Rogerson, and
Wright (1996). This observation is consistent with the notion that sunspot models simply
offer a new source of shocks. From an econometric perspective, they are not qualitatively
different from models with fundamental shocks.
Our final test of the model focuses on its implications for the agg-regate production
technology, (2.11). To assessthe plausibility of this formulation, we plot the log of output per
unit of capital versus the log of per capita hours worked in Figure 10. (See the observations
marked *.) The output and capital stock data used are the quarterly data covering the period
1955Q3–1984Q1 studied in Christian (1988) and Christian and Eichenbaum (1992). The
data do indicate a positive relation, but it is not M strong as the one implied by the model, in
30which log(y/k) = 210g(n). One way to assess the plausibility of the model is to compare this
line with the least squmes line fitted through the U.S. data points. A factor complicating
the comparison with this data is that the model does not contain a theory of the error term
in this relation-clearly one is needed, given the wide dispersion of the U.S. data points.
Now, suppose the errors reflect technology shocks, which could easily be incorporated into
the analysis. Then, assuming equilibrium labor responds positively to technology shocks, a
standard simultaneity bias argument implies that the slope of the least squares line is biased
upward, as an estimate of the power on hours worked in the aggregate production function.
(See Klenow 1992.) Thus, conditional on interpreting the dispersion of data points in Figure
10 M reflecting the effects of technology shocks, we conclude that the data in that figure
constitute a rejection of the very high power on hours worked in the production function of
this paper.21
To summarize the results so
context of our model—it is far
far, the analysis in this section shows that—at least in the
from true that “anything goes” empirically with sunspot
models. The models can be tested using standard econometric methods-GMM procedures
for compming sample and model-based second moments, GMM procedures for testing Euler
equations, and standard mtimurn likelihood procedures. Although the conventional sunspot
equilibrium does a surprisingly good job of accounting for business cycle phenomena, in the
end, its strong increasing returns assumption is rejected by the data.22
21 This complements findings in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1995) and in the references they cite.
22For an attempt to extend our analysis to a version of the model with a smaller externality, see Guo and
Lansing (1996).
315.4. Welfare Analysis
We approximated the expected discounted utility for our equilibria using a Monte Carlo sim-
ulation method. For the conventional sunspot equilibrium and the regime switching sunspot
equilibrium, the expected present discounted utilities are –378.21 (0.24) and –570.58 (1.77),
respectively (numbers in parentheses
the impact on utility of variance in
utility for a high variance version of
are Monte Carlo standard errors).2S To understand
the Etier error, s(2), we also computed expected
our conventional sunspot equilibrium. In this case,
s(2) E {– 0.55, 0.55}. The expected present value of utility for this equilibrium is –363.35
(2.14). The present discounted level of utility associated with the constant employment
deterministic equilibrium
employment equilibrium.
at fi2 is – 378,49. We refer to this equilibrium as the constant
To compare these welfare numbers, we converted them to consumption equivalents. That
is, we computed the constant percentage incre~e in consumption required in the constant
emplo~ent equilibrium to make a household indtierent between that equilibrium and an-
other given equilibrium. The results are shown in Table 4. They indicate that going from the
constant employment equilibrium to the regime switching sunspot equilibrium is equivalent
to a 289 percent permanent drop in consumption. Going to the conventional sunspot equi-
librium is equivalent to a 0.9 percent permanent rise in consumption, and going to the high
23 Foremh equilibrium, we drew1,000 histories, St, each truncated to be of length 2, 500 observations.
Subject to the initial level of employment being fi2 always, we computed consumption and employment along
each history. For each equilibrium, we computed 1,000 present discounted values of utility, VI, ....Vlooo.
Our M~&~ Calo estimate of expected present discounted utility, u, is the sample average of these: u =
& ~i=l vi. The fact that we use a finite number of replications implies that u is approximately normally
distributed with mean v and standard deviation IS~/~~, where ui is estimated by the standard deviation
of VI,...,Vlooo.we refer to ui /~~ as the MonteCarlostandard error.
32variance version of that equilibrium is equivalent to an 11.2 percent rise in consumption.
An interesting feature of these results is that, despite concavity in the utility function,
increasing volatility in s(2) raises welfare. This reflects a trade-off between two factors.
First, other things being the same, a concave utility function implies that a sunspot equilib-
rium is welfare-inferior to a constant, deterministic equilibrium (concatitg eflect). However,
other things are not
consumption can be
the same. The increasing returm means that by bunching hard work,
increased on average without raising the average level of employment
(bunching eflect). When the volatility of the model economy with
increased by raising the volatility of s(2), then the bun~hing effect
initial employment fi2 is
dominates the concavity
effect. men volatility is instead increased by allowing regime switches, then the concavity
effect dominates. In interpreting these results, it is important to recognize that they say
nothing about
are inefficient,
the nature of the efficient allocations. All of the equilibria that we consider
because of the presence of the externality in production.
6. Policy Analysis
We now consider the impact of various policies on the set of equilibria. We consider two
countercyclicd tax polici~ that reduce the set of interior equilibria to a singleton in that
output is a constant. We refer to the first as a pure stabilizer because it does not distort
margins in equilibrium. The second t= policy introduces just the right distortions so that
the equilibrium supports the optimal allocations. We show that, for a tax policy to isolate
the efficient allocations as a unique equilibrium, it is necessary that the tax rate vary in the
33right way with the state of the economy. For example, under a comtant tax rate policy, the
equilibrium is not unique. Interestingly, the equilibria are isolated in this case, so that they




section, we display a particular procyclical tax rate rule which reduces the set of
equilibria to a singleton with nt = fi2 for all t (the constant employment equilibrium). The
t= policy has the property that in equilibrium, the tm rate is always zero and thus does not
distort any margins. Given our previous rwults for the constant employment equilibrium,
this tax rate rule improves welfare relative to the regime switching sunspot equilibrium, but
actually reduces welfare relative to the conventional sunspot equilibrium. The possibility
that stabilization of a sunspot by government policy might reduce welfare should not be
surprising, given that both the sunspot equilibrium and the fi2 equilibrium are inefficient.
Consider the following t= rate:
fi2
T(n) =l–; (6.1)
where n denotes economywide average employment and fi2 is the higher of the two nonsto
chastic steady state employment levels. (See Fi~e lb. ) Note that this t= rate is zero when
aggregate employment is fi2. It turns positive for higher levek of employment and negative
for lower levels.
Let ti(n, n’) denote (3.6) after substituting out for T(n) from (6.1). It is easily verfied
34that, for each value of n, there is at most one n’ that solves ti(n, n’) = O.This is given by
fi2– K(n)(l – 6)





~(1 -n), A(n) =n’+1 -6- ~fi2(l -n)
~
The function, ~, and its derivative, fl, have the property that at n = 1,
f(l) =
since afi2 < 1. Figure 11 shows f
two branches of v = O, ~Uand jl,
under our baseline parameter values. For convenience, the
are also displayed.
There are three things worth emphasizing about ~. First, it cuts the 45-degree line
below at n = fi2, and it intersects the horizontal axis at a positive level of employment.
from
This
implies that there is no infinite sequence, n~, t = O,1,2, ....
such that nt > 0 for all t. Since satisfaction of the Euler
with no < fi2 and nt = f(nt–1),
equation, Z = O, is a necessary
condition for an interior solution to the household problem, it follows that there is no interior
equilibrium with no < fi2. Second, a sequence of employments, nt, t = O,1, .... which has the
property nt = f(nt-l) and no > ii2, has the property nt ~ 1 m t ~ m. Appealing again to
the necessity of the Euler equation, we conclude that there is no interior equilibrium with
no > fi’. Third, nt = fi2 for all t satisfies the Euler and transversality conditions and so
corresponds to an interior equilibrium. Thus, the only deterministic interior equilibrium is
35the one that corresponds to nt = ii2 for t = O,1, .... That sunspot equilibria are also rtied
out follows from the fact that the Euler equation cuts the 45-degree line from below and
from the arguments in Woodford (1986a). These remmks establish
Proposition 6.1. For the b=eline parametrization and under the tax policy in (6.l), there
is a um”queinterior eqw”librium m“th n.t= fi2 for d] t.
Note that under the tax rate policy considered here, ~~ = O in equilibrium. Evidently,
the mere threat to change t= rates is enough to rule out other equilibria. This feature of
fiscal (and monetary) policies designed to select certain equilibria is common in models with
multiple expect ational equilibria. (See, for example, Boldrin 1992, p. 215 and Guesnerie and




efficient allocations correspond to a fictitious planner’s choice of investment, employ-
ment, and consumption to maximize discounted utility subject to the resource constraint.
We reproduce the utility fmction here for convenience:
~ ~;~’p(s’){log[c(s’)] + olog[l - n(s’)]}.
t=o St
The resource constraint is
(6.2)
C(st) + k(s~) – (1 – 6)k(st–1) ~ k(st–l)[n(s’)]2, for all t, St. (6.3)
36This problem simplifies greatly. Thus, using the change of variable in (3.2) and the identity
5 Z@’P(”) logk(s’-’)
t=o St
the objective function can be written
~ ~B’P(’t) {log[n(’t)’+ 1-6- A(”)] + & log A(st)
t=o St
+Olog[l – n(s~)]} + * logko.
In (6.5), consumption has been substituted out using the
replacing the weak inequality in (6.3)
is separable across dates and states.
efficient allocations are insensitive to
by a strict equality.
(scaled) resource constraint





This has two implications. First, unsurprisingly, the
sunspots. Second, the efficient Ievek of employment
and capital accumulation do not exhibit cycles. It is trivially verified that this result is
independent of the curvature on leisure in the utility function, the degree of nonconvexit y on
labor in the production function, and the degree of homogeneity on capital in the resource
constraint 24 Thus, for example, increasing the gains from bunching production, by raising
the power on labor above 2, and reducing the msociated costs, by making utility linear in
leisure, still does not imply that the efficient allocations exhibit cycles.
24Lack of cycling in the efficient allocations also obtains for utility functions which are homogeneous of
degree ~ # O in consumption. See the Appendix for further discussion.
37With our specification of preferences, optimizing (6.5) requires that the planner mmirnize,
for each t, St,
log[n2+l–6– A]+ D ~ log A + alog[l – n]
by choice of n and A, subject to
(6.6)
(6.7)
The objective, (6.6), is not concave, because of the nonconcavity in the production function.
However, for tied n, (6.6) is strictly concave in A, and its optimal value is readily determined
to be A = ~(n2 + 1 – 6). Substituting this into (6.6), the criterion maximized by the efficient
allocation becomes
~ log(n2 + 1 – 6) + alog(l – n) (6.8)
after constant terms are ignored. The constraint on this problem is O ~ n ~ 1. There are
two values of n that set the first-order condition associated with mtimizing (6.8), and the
larger of the two is the global optimum. This is given by no, where
(6.9)
With the baseline parameter values, no = 0.98, which implies that the optimal value of A is
1.94, or 94 percent per quarter, The fact that equilibrium employment is so high reflects the
38fact that the efficient allocations internalize the externality in the production function.
It is easily verified that the tm rate which supports no as an equilibrium is ~ = –2. It
is not surprising that this involves a subsidy, since the t= must in effect coax individuals
into internalizing the positive externality associated with production. Consider first the case
in which the t= rate is simply bed at ~ = –2 for every n. Let ti(n, n.’) denote (3.6) after
substituting out for ~ = – 2. In effect, reducing T born zero to -2 pushes the saddle in Figure
la down, so that the w = Oplane now covers the seat of the saddle. The consequences can
be seen in Figure 12a, which displays the values of n’ that solve ti(n, n’) = O for n E (O,1).
Note the region of values for n for which there are no values of n’ that solve i(n, n,’) = O.
In the other regions, there are generally
n. Interestingly, the unique intersection
two values of n’ that solve this equation for each
of these points with the 45-degree line, at no, is
associated with a slope greater than one. As a result, the equilibrium associated with
n“, no, no, ... is determinate. However, there is at least one other equilibrium, H,no, no, ....
(See Figure 12a for fi.) Evidently, the constant t= rate policy does not guarantee a unique
equilibrium.
One way to construct a tax regime that selects only the desirable equilibrium follows the




Evidently, with this policy, r(n”) = –2, so that there is an equilibrium associated with this
t= policy which supports the efficient allocations. Also, it is easily verified that—following
39the same reasoning as in the preceding subsection—the Euler equation has only one branch.
In addition, we found for the baseline parameter values that this branch is monotone, and
it cuts the 45-degree line from below. It follows by the logic leading to Proposition 6.1 that
there is a unique interior equilibrium.
7. Conclusion and Directions for Future Research
We have displayed a model environment which rationalizes implementing a tax regime which
is procyclical in the
committed to raise
sense that if aggregate employment were to rise, the government stands
the tax rate. In this sense, the environment seems to rationalize the
importance assigned by macroeconomists before the 1970s to devising automatic stabilizer
tn systems.2J But, since a properly constructed tax regime eliminates fluctuating equilibria,
the actual tax rate is constant.
model with fundamental shocks,
We expect this basic result to survive in
Thus, if there were technology shocks, we
versions of our
conjecture that
the optimal tax rate regime would move procyclically with sunspot shocks, but would not
vary with technology shocks. Assuming an efficient tax regime eliminates sunspot equilibria,
the optimal “automatic stabilizer” t= rate would then not be procyclical in equilibrium.
An interesting question for future resemch would be to inv~tigate what happens when the
t= regime cannot respond differently to fluctuations due to sunspots and to fluctuations
due to technology shocks. Possibly, under these circumstances an efficiently constructed tax
regime would exhibit procyclical behavior in equilibrium. Another interesting question for
25 Fora discussion of “automaticstabilkers,”seeChristian (1984).
40future research would explore the robustness of our result that a properly constructed tm
regime necessarily stabilizes fluctuations. We have shown that this is so under a ptiicdar
homogeneity assumption on the resource constraint. But, standard models do not satisfy
this condition.
41Table 1: First-Moment Properties
n I c/g k/y i/y growth in k growth in y
Panel A: U.S. Data
0.23 0.73 10.62 0.27 1.0047 1.0040
Panel C: Real Business Cycle Model
Note: Entries in the table are the meW of the indicated variable.. U.S. data results we
taken from Christian (1988). Statlstlcs based on model economes are computed using
0.23 I 0.73 I 10.64 I 0.27 I 1.0040 I 1.0040
Panel B: Conventional Sunspot
.309 0.745 10.46 0.255 1.0045 1.0046
Panel D: Regime Switching Sunspot
.094 5.17 298 –4.17 0.989 4.74
100 artificial data sets of length 114 each. Entries in the table are an aver~ge of 100.-
42I Table 2: Second-Moment Properties I
Xt ox /uy Correlation of yt with Zt+.
7=2 7=1 T=o 7-=-1 T=–2
Panel A: U.S. Data
Y 0.02 0.65 0.86 1,00 0.86 0.65
c 0.46 0.48 0.66 0.78 0.76 0.61
i 2.91 0.33 0.56 0.71 0.68 0.57
n 0.82 0.69 0.81 0.82 0.66 0.41
y/n 0.58 0.12 0.32 0.55 0.55 0.53
y/n, n 0.70 –0.17 –0.07 –0.03 0.21 0.33
Panel B: Standard Real Business Cycle
Y 0.02 0.51 0.74 1.00 0.74 0.51
c 0.55 0.59 0.78 0.98 0.69 0.44
i 2.37 0.45 0.70 0.99 0.76 0.55
n 0.38 0.40 0.67 0.98 0.77 0.57
y/n 0.63 0.57 0.78 0.99 0.71 0.47
y/n, n 1.65 0.61 0.77 0.94 0.61 0.33
Note: Restits are taken from Christian and Todd (1996, tables 2 and 3). Panel B results
are based on 2,000 Wificial observations simtiated from a standard real business cycle
model. In both panels, prior to computing statistics, data were logged and Hodrick-
Prescott filtered. The model corresponds to the one in this paper, with o = 3.92,
~ = O,6 = 0.021, a = 0.344, and a production function hm the form Y = Ka(zn)tl-”),
with z = z–lezp(A), and A N llN(O.004, 0.0182), The last two rows of each panel
report the standard deviation of productivity (y/n) relative to that of hours (n). The
correlations reported there me COTT [(y/n)t, nt–,].
43Table 3: Second-Moment Properties, Sunspot Equilibria
Xt Uxluy Correlation of yt with Z~+T
T=2 T=l 7=() 7=–1 7=–2
Panel A: Conventional Sunspot
Y 0.02 0.35 0.63 1.00 0.63 0.35
c 0.33 0.58 0.72 0.87 0.44 0.13
a 3.13 0.26 0.57 0.99 0.66 0.40
n 0.51 0.22 0.54 0.98 0.66 0.42
y/n 0.52 0.46 0.69 0.98 0.57 0.27
y/n, n 1.02 0.49 0.68 0.91 0.44 0.11
Panel B: Regime Switching Sunspot
Y 0.78 –0.07 –0.07 1.00 –0.07 –0.07
c 0.06 0.25 0.30 0.35 –0.42 –0.35
i na na na na na na
n 0.54 –0.11 0.11 0.99 –0.01 –0.03
y/n 0.47 –0.03 –0.02 0.99 –0.13 –0.12
y/n, n 0.88 0.01 0.02 0.96 –0.19 –0.17
Note: Model statistics are computed in the same way M for Panel B in Table 2. The
notation “na” appews in the investment column of Panel B, because gToss investment
is often negative.
44Table 4: Percentage Utility Gain Relative to Constant Equilibrium
Conventional Sunspot I Conventional Sunspot 11 Regime Switching
0.9% 11.2% –289%
Note: This is the constant percentage decrease in consumption required for households in
the indicated equilibrium to be indifferent between that equilibrium and the constant
equilibrium at n = fi2. Let v denote the discounted utility associated with the constant
employment level. Let t denote the discounted utility associated with one of the other
equilibria. Then, the number in the table is 100[exp((l – ~) (Z – t))) – 1].
45A. Appendix: Linearity of Policy Rules Under Homogeneity
In this appendix, we establish efficiency for a policy of the form, kt+l = A“h and nt = n,*,
where A“, n* are fixed numbers. We do this for a class of economies in which the resource
constraint is homogeneous in capital and in which preference are homogeneous in consump
tion. Our result pmallels that in Alvarez and Stokey (1995), except their environment does
not explicitly allow for variable hours worked.
Consider the following planning problem:
(Al)
subject to the following femibility constraints:
We assume that F is homogeneous:
ln terms of A and n, the constraints on the planner are:
That is, the plmer’s feasible set is the set of infinite sequences, {At, nt}~O, such that
At,nt c B for each t ~ O.We place the following assumptions on ~ :
~ : B ~ R, continuom, decreasing in A, and increasing in n. (A.3)
Also,




there exists O~ fi ~ 1 such that ~(1, fi) >0.
We place the following assumptions on u:
U(C,n) = c7g(n)/~, ~ # O, g(n) ~ O, g is continuous and decreasing. (A.6)
We have the following proposition:
Proposition Al. If
(i) the functions F and u satisfy (A.2)-(A.3), and (A.6),
(ii) (A.4) holds when ~ >0, and (A.5) holh when ~ <0.
then, a policy of the folJowingform solves (A. 1):
k,+l = A“kt, nt = n“, t z O, for fied (n*, A*) c B.
Proofi Write U(C,n) = k~o (f(~, n))y g(n)/~. Also,
()
t–1








We establish –m < w < m. When ~ <0, then u is bounded above by zero and so trivially,
w < w. For the case v > 0, consider the (itie=ible!) policy of applying the entire time
endoment both to labor effort and to leisure, and of applying W of output both to con-
sumption and to investment. The due of tfis policy is ti = (j(O, 1))7 g(0)/ [7(1 – Oi’v)] .
We have w < w, since w < ti < m. To establish –m < w when T >0 note simply that
47u is bounded below by zero in tfis case. For the case ~ < 0, note that the feasible polic~
At = 1, nt = h, for t ~ O has retmn k~vti, where ti = ~(1, fi)vg(fi)/ [7(1 – ~)] , so that
—m<ti <w.
We have established that w is a finite scalar. By ~iting (A. 7) out explicitly, one verifies
that w satisfies the following exprmsion:
(A.8)
Let A“ and n* denote dues of A. and no that solve the above m=”m”zation problem. The
result follows from the fact that these solve a problem in which the objectives and constraints
are independent of ko. Q.E.D.
Remark 1. The proof for the class of utility functions U(C,n,) = log(c) + g(n) is a trivial
perturbation on the argument in the text,
Remark 2. When ~ > 0, then the fied point problem in (A. 8) can be shown to be the
fied point of a contraction mapping. ln this case, w in (A. 7) is the ody solution to (A.8),
and the contraction mapping theorem provides an iterative algorithm for computing w, A“,
and n*. men ~ <0, the mapping implicitly defined in (A.8) is not necessarily a contraction.
Almez and Stokey (1995) supply iterative schemes for computing w in this case.
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54Figure 1a: The v(n ,n’) Function
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Note: Figure la is a three-dimensional view of thefunction v in equation (3.6), computed usingthe standard
parametervalues, The darkandlight regions identify thepartsof v thatareless thanand greaterthanzero,
respectively. Figure 1b shows the valuesof n‘ thatsetv(n,n’) to zero, given n. Here,J and~U denote the
lower and upper branch functions defined in (3.9), restively. Also, Z’ and;2 denote thepoints where~
crosses the45-degrm line. Figure 1c displaysj~n)-n from Figure 1b for values of n in a neighborhood of
theongin. Itshows thatj firstcuts the45-degree line from below, atE*,andthen again from above, atfiz.Figure 2: Two Equilibria on the Lower Branch ‘“ - - ““ -
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Figure 11: Euler Equation, v(n,n’)=0, for Taxed and Untaxed Economies
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